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792 PEOPLE 11. MCKAY [37 C.2d 
[Crim. No. 5212. In Bank. Oct. 15. 1951.J 
THE PEOPLE, Respondent, v. JAMES McKAY et aI., 
Appellants. 
[1] Criminal Law-Change of Venue-Heartng-Discretion.-A 
motion for change of venue in a criminal action, on the ground 
that a fair and impartial trial cannot be bad in the county, 
is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. (See 
Pen. Code, §§ 1033-1035.) 
[2] Id.-Change of Venue-Order.-Wben the facts on a motion 
for change of venue demonstrate that a fair and impartial trial 
cannot be had in the county, an order must be made trans-
ferring the action to the proper court of some convenient 
county free from a like objection. (Pen. Code, § 1035.) 
[3] Id. - Change of Venue - Hearing - Determination. - It was 
prejudicial error to deny defendants' motions for a change of 
venue in a homicide case where decedents were popular officers 
of a small county; defendants were strangers with bad rep'.lta-
tions; the homicides were given extensive and continuing 
publicity in the local newspaper; there was talk of lynching, 
and defendants were taken to the state prison for safekeeping; 
no available member of the county bar was sufficiently free-
from bias or prejudice to participate in the defense; and a 
letter written by the regular trial judge to the board of super-
visors, referring to the unanimous opinion of defense counsel 
that defendants were guilty, was printed in the local paper both 
before the trial and at the time the jury was being selected. 
[4] Id.-Change of Venue-Hearing-Determination.-Fact that 
there is abundant evidence of defendants' guilt of the murders 
charged does not excuse denial of their motions for a change 
of venue, and regardless of their guilt, they are entitled to 
a fair and impartial trial. 
APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Shasta 
County and from orders denying a new trial and denying a II 
change of venue. Benjamin C. Jones, Judge.- Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgments of conviction reversed. 
[1) See 7 Cal.Jur. 920; 56 Am.Jur. 54. 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Criminal Law, § 97; [2] Criminal Law, 
§ 98; [3, 4) Criminal Law, § 96. 
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Rupert Crittenden and Kennl'dy .Jackson, under appoint-
ment by the Supreme Court, for Appellants. 
Edmund G. Brown, Attorney General, Doris H. Maier and 
Wallace G. Colthurst, Deputy Attorneys General; for Re-
spondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-Defendants James McKay and Robert 
Sturm, 18 and 19 years of age respectively, escaped from 
a Youth Authority camp at Whitmore in Shasta County. 
They went to Seattle, where they were arrested and detained. 
Earl Sholes, undersheriff, and Dan Heryford, a deputy sheriff 
of Shasta County, took custody of defendants in Seattle. On 
the return trip by automobile the two officers rode in front, 
the two defendants in back. Each defendant was handcuffed 
separately with his hands in front of him. While the auto-
mobile was traveling through a sparsely inhabited mountain 
area each defendant lunged forward on a prearranged signal 
and struck the officer directly in front on the head and 
shoulders. During the struggle the car skidded to a stop, 
and one of the defendants secured one of the officers' guns. 
The officers were shot and fatally wounded, and their bodies 
dragged down an embankment by the side of the highway. 
Defendants removed various articles from the officers' cloth-
ing and then fled in the car. They were apprehended the 
following day. There is a conflict in the evidence as to the 
way in which the shots were fired and by which defendant 
and as to whether the homicides were a premeditated or 
spontaneous part of the escape plan. The jury found de-
fendants guilty of two counts of murder of the first degree 
without recommendation. 
Defendants contend that the trial court committed preju-
dicial error in denying their motions for a change of venue. 
(See Pen. Code, §§ 1033-1035.) [1] A motion for a change 
of venue on the ground that a fair and impartial trial cannot 
be had in the county is addressed to the sound discretion of 
the trial court. (People v. Cullen, ante, pp. 614, 627 [234 
P .2d 1] , and cases cited.) [2] When the facts demonstrate that 
such a trial cannot be had "an order must be made transfer-
ring the action to the proper court of some convenient county 
free from a like objection." (Pen. Code, § 1035; People v. 
Suesser, 132 Cal. 631, 635 [64 P. 1095] ; People v. Yoakum, 
53 Cal. 566, 571.) We have concluded in the light of the 
J 
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circumstances established by the record that this is such a 
case. 
[3] The decedents were well known, popular officers of 
a small county. Defendants were strangers with bad reputa-
tions. The homicides were given extensive aud continuing 
publicity in the local newspaper, which was widely circulat<.'d 
in the county. The accounts of the crime emphasized the 
fact that defendants had confessed. At the time of the 
crimes the community was thoroughly aroused, there was 
talk of lynching, and defendants were taken to the state 
prison for safekeeping. Although affidavits filed in opposi-
tion to the motions for char.ge of venue stated that by the 
time of trial the feeling of public indignation had consider· 
ably cooled, they did not deny the existence of widespr<.'ad 
bias and prejudice against defendants. When defendants 
moved to disqualify Judge Ross of the Superior Court of 
Shasta County he stated that if he were conducting a trial 
without a jury "then perhaps the things stated by.ihe de-
fense would constitute a disqualification." He was pro-
hibited from proceeding with the trial of the cause. (McKay 
v. Superior Court, 98 Cal.App.2d 770 [220 P.2d 945].) At 
the time the trial was originally commenced before Judge 
Ross and at the time it was continued before Judge Jones, 
who was assigned to the case from Lake County, no available 
member of the Shasta County bar was sufficiently free from 
bias or prejudice to participate in the defense. At the time 
of trial one of the local attorneys, after stating· reasons why 
he should not serve, said, "Despite that situation, feeling as I 
do the responsibility with which the attorneys here and myself 
are burdened in such an unhappy situation. I would be willing 
to do my best to act as attorney for these boys or either one 
of them, knowing that it is not a popular thing to do, knowing 
that maybe in the defense of these boys I might offend a friend 
whom I revere, but despite that I would accept it." One of 
the defense attorneys appointed from outside the county was 
unable to find any local citizen who would execute an affidavit 
in support of the motions for change of venue. All of the 
more than 20 persons he interviewed stated that the vaSt 
majority of persons in Shasta County believed defendants 
gUilty and thought they should receive the extreme penalty. 
All of them, however, refused to execute affidavits to that 
effect because of the criticism it would engender. 
Public indignation against defendants was further aroused 
by the publicity given to a letter written by Judge Ross to 
,) 
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the board of supervisors. At the time Judge Ross appointed 
counsel for defendants, he suggested to them that some 
provision could probably be made to reimburse them for the 
expenses that would be incurred because they would have to 
come from a distance to undertake the defense. Aft('r these 
counsel were successful in having Judge Ross prohibited from 
proceeding with the case, some of them filed a claim with the 
board of supervisors for expenses. Judge Ross wrote the 
board of supervisors that the claim should not be paid. After 
giving the history of the ease before the opening of the trial 
before him, Judge Ross wrote: 
"On the morning of July 18, with 125 jurors waiting to 
be called and for the trial to commence, the attorneys asked 
to confer with me in my office before going into court. They 
then said they were going to file affidavits of prejudice against 
me so that I would have to call in another judge to preside. 
They stated that they had nothing personal against me and 
considered that I would be fair and impartial, but that 
they owed this duty to their clients. I asked if that meant 
they were going to waive a jury trial when a new judge was 
brought in, and they said they would have to see about that 
later and that the first step was to get a new judge in for 
the case. I ~alIed their attention to the fact that 125 jurors 
were getting $5 per day and mileage to be there, and they 
just shrugged their shoulders. 
"We then went into court and they filed affidavits of 
prejudice against me. 1 asked in open court if they intended 
to waive a jury if a new judge came in and remade my offer 
to voluntarily step out without admitting disqualification in 
case of a waiver of jury or a plea of Guilty. They would not 
state what their plans were. (1 had in mind that all four 
attorneys had stated in our conferences in my office many times 
that they had gone over the case with the defendants, and 
that there was no question of the guilt of both defendants of 
the crime of murder and that their only hope was to get them 
off with life imprisonment, although they might try to argue 
to a jury that it was only second degree murder.) 
"Under the law all I could do was to have the Judicial 
Council in San Francisco get some other Superior Court 
Judge to come in and pass on my disqualifications. Therefore, 
on July 19th, Judge Warren Steel of Marysville came up 
and heard both sides of this matter and decided that there was 
nothing in the record to show that I was disqualified. 
"Vole proceeded with the case on the 20th and 21st, and on 
) 
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t.hc 25th and 26th of July, and had almost succeeded in 
selecting a jury for the trial when a writ of prohibition from 
the appellate court halted us. This was heard on August 2d 
in Sacramento, and on the 3d the appellate court held that 
I was disqualified. 
"Although we must obey this decision. it was wrong and 
I was not actually disqualified, and all four attorneys for 
the defendants at one time or another admitted this to me. 
They therefore did what they did apparently for delay of 
the case and to make it as expensive on the county as· they 
could. Nothing they did was directed towards having a trial 
on legal evidence to decide whether McKay and Sturm did 
or did not commit murder. I therefore feel that they are 
not entitled to be paid anything for what they have done in 
this case." 
Judge Ross's letter was printed in the local paper in its 
entirety approximately two weeks before the trial commenced 
before Judge Jones, and the part referring to the unanimous 
opinion of defense counsel that defendants were guilty was 
reprinted at the time the jury was being selected. 
A jury and two alternates were selected with difficulty after 
10 trial days and the examination of approximately 251 po~- I 
sible jurors. Although all peremptory challenges were exl 
hausted, there remained on the jury persons familiar with the __ 
publicity given the case, including Judge Ross's letter. 
It has recently been held that "The popularity of the de-
cedent, the fact that the inhabitants are well known to each 
other in a small county, and the customary newspaper pub-
licity, do not necessarily warrant the granting of a motion for 
change of venue." (People v. Mendes, 35 Cal.2d 537, 542 
[219 P.2d 1] ; see, also, People v. Brite, 9 Cal.2d 666, 689-690 
[72 P.2d 122].) In the present case, however, a much more 
compelling showing has been made that defendants could 
not receive a fair and impartial trial in Shasta County. The 
record is replete with evidence, not only of general bias and 
prejudice against defendants, but of antagonism so intense 
that the local citizens hesitated or refused to take part in 
any effort directed toward securing to defendants their legal 
rights. 
Although it may be true that the feeling of substantial 
citizens at the time of the crimes that "the courts should 
not waste time on persons such as [defendants], but that in-
stead [they] should be lynched and 'strung up,' " had cooled 
by the time of the trial, the record demonstrates that it had 
) 
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been replaced by a cool, widely held conviction that defendants 
were guilty and should be tried and sentenced to death as 
expeditiously as possible. The community was determined 
that defendants be given no quarter. In no other way can 
be explained the antagonism toward defense counselor the 
fact that "all of said persons with whom {defense counsel) 
talked refused to make an affidavit concerning said public 
feeling and requested that {defe~e counsel] not disclose 
their names, upon the ground that they believed they would 
be criticized by their friends, customers and other persons of 
Shasta County." 
The countershowing oft'ered in affidavits presented by the 
prosecution created no real conflict with the evidence presented 
by the defense. In his affidavit in opposition to the motions 
for change of venue the sheriff stated, "That the feeling of 
publ1p. indignation arid resentment that existed against James 
McKay and Robert Sturm up to the time when they were 
transported from Folsom State Penitentiary to the Shasta 
County Jail on June 3, 1950, has subsided and cooled con-
siderably since that date and the only public feeling of in-
dignation that exists now in Shasta County in connection 
with the killing of Earl Sholes and Dan Heryford is a cool, 
calm an? wholesome feeling that justice be administered in 
the murder action now pending against James McKay and 
Robert Sturm." Other affidavits were of similar import. 
The countershowing was essentially similar to that made 
in People v. Suesser, 132 Cal. 631, 634 {64 P. 1095], where the 
court said, "This amounted to little more than a showing 
that after the lapse of a few days the excitement abated, and 
there was no real intent to lynch the defendant. Also, that 
there was not 80 much excitement in the remote parts of 
the county. That but one opinion in regard to the guilt of 
the defendant existed throughout the county, is admitted. 
There was no pretense that such opinion had changed, but 
only that the feeling against the defendant was less in-
tense ...• 
"Where such a state of things exist, the defendant cannot 
have a fair and impartial trial. If the change of venue should 
not be granted in this case, I think the statute should be 
repealed. Wby courts should hesitate to grant change of 
venue in a proper case, I cannot understand. It seems that 
many, perhaps most, of the merchants and business men of 
Sali~as made affidavits of the nature I have stated above to 
prevent such a change. Why , Was it feared the defendant 
\ } 
) 
798 PEOPLE v. MCKAY .[37 C.2d 
would escape if he were allowed a fair trial' It is suggested 
that there is undue delay in reaching final judgment. Those 
who complain of delay have prejudged the case, but delays 
are too often caused by plain disregard of obvious rights of 
friendless and unpopular defendants." 
In view of the prevailing atmosphere in the community, 
the fact that from 251 persons it was possible to select 14 who 
thought they could try the case fairly does not sustain the 
conclusion that a fair trial could be had. Because they had 
exhausted all of their peremptory challenges defendants were 
forced to go to trial before jurors who were familiar with the 
publicity that had been given to the case. One juror stated 
that she took it for granted that the officers were murdered 
by defendants. Another knew one of the decedents by sight, 
and a third knew all the members of a family that was 
related to one of the decedents. This juror's husband also 
worked part time as a deputy sheriff. Another juror testified 
that Mr. Heryford, one of the decedents, "belonged to an 
old Shasta County family as I do myself and I know of 
him .... " Moreover, none of the jurors could have been 
unaware of the popular feeling. They knew, just as the local 
attorneys knew, that any verdict other than guilty without 
recommendation would be highly unpopular in the community. 
They, just as the citizens who refused to execute affidavits, 
had to continue living with their neighbors. 
[4] Because of the abundant evidence of guilt, it is con-
tended that defendants could nut have been prejudiced by the 
widespread antagonism against them. Regardless of their guilt, 
however, they were entitled to a fair and impartial trial. 
(Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 87-88, 92 [43 S.Ct. 265, 67 
L.Ed. 543]; see concurring opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson 
in Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 [71 S.Ct. 549, 95 
L.Ed. 740].) "Neither can a plea for the application of 
[Article VI, section 4lf2] of the constitution save this situa-
tion. The fact that a record shows a defendant to be guilty 
of a crime does not necessarily determine that there has 
been no miscarriage of justice. In this case the defendant 
did not have the fair trial guaranteed to him by law and 
the constitution." (People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 627 
[258 P. 607).) 
Moreover, the jury was presented with the problem of 
determining the penalty to be imposed. Had one of the 
defendants been one month younger and the other approxi-
mately one year younger the death penalty could not be 
(let. 1951] PEOPLE v. MCKAY 
f37C.2d 792: 236 l' .2d 145J 
799 
illlposed. (Peu. Code, § 190.) The considerations that led 
the Legislature to provide that no murder committed by a 
person under 18 years of age should be punishable by death 
might lead a jury to recommend life imprisonment for de-
fendants slightly over that age. By law the determination 
of the penalty is left solely to the discretion of the jury 
(Pen. Code, §190), and accordingly, it was of vital importance 
that they should exercise that discretion free from bias, 
prejudice, or pressure from the community. 
Not only was such freedom of deliberation denied to the 
jury, but at least some of its members were aware of the 
statements made by Judge Ross in his letter to the board of 
supervisors. One juror testified as follows: 
"Q. You say you did read the Judge's lettert A. Yes. 
"Q. Was there anything in that letter that would cause you 
to form an opinion one way or the other concerning the guilt 
or innocence of the defendants? A. No. I figure-well, I 
don't know just how to answer that. Ali, far as making up 
an oplmon. Judge Ross made quite a statement as far as 
that goes .... 
• , Q. . . . Would you say from the recollection of the letter 
Judge Ross wrote that the Judge expressed himself concern-
ing the guilt or innocence of the defendants' A. Well, I 
would say he expressed himself, yes." 
Judge Ross's letter not only stated that all defense counsel 
conceded defendants' guilt, but also bitterly attacked the 
methods of the defense. If his statements had been made 
by a judge presiding at the trial they would clearly have 
required a reversal. (People v. Mahoney, 201 Cal. 618, 626-627 
[258 P. 607).) "'It is obvious that under any system of 
jury trials the influence of· the trial judge on the jury is 
necessarily and properly of great weight, and that his lightest 
word or intimation is received with deference, and may prove 
controlling.'" (Sanguinetti v. Moore Dry Dock Co., 36 Cal. 
2d 812, 819 [228 P.2d 557], quoting from Starr v. United 
States, 153 U.S. 614,626 [14 S.Ct. 919, 38 L.Ed. 841].) Judge 
Ross was well known in the county and had been the only 
regular superior court judge for approximately 17 years. 
In the latest election he had received the highest number of 
votes of any county officer. His opinions were known to 
members of the jury. Under such circumstances the prejudi-
cal effect of his statements was not materially less because they 
were made outside rather than inside the courtroom. 
) 
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It is unnecessary to determine which, if any, of the facts 
and circumstances of this case standing alone would require 
the granting of a motion for change of venue. When local 
feeling is so intense that the presentation of defendants' case 
is impeded, members of the jury are familiar with the facts in 
advance of the trial and are aware of the intense antagonism 
of the community toward defendants, and the regular trial 
judge has forcefully presented his opinions as to the merits 
of the case and attacked the good faith of defense counsel, a 
change of venue should bc ordered. However conscientious 
the members of the jury may have been, it cannot reasonably 
be concluded that they could so divorce themselves from their 
past experiences and present surroundings that a fair and 
impartial trial could be had. 
"The prisoner, whether guilty or not, is unquestionably 
entitled by the law of the land to have a fair and impartial 
trial. Unless this result be attaIned, one of the most im-
portant purposes for which Government is ...erganized and 
Oourts of Justice established will have definitely failed. Oases 
sometimes occur, and this would appear to be one of them, 
in which the very enormity of the offense itself arouses the 
honest indignation of the community to such a degree as 
to make it apparent that a dispassionate investigation of the 
case cannot be had. Under such circumstances the law re-
quires that the place of trial be changed." (People v. 1" oakum, 
53 Cal. 566, 571.) 
The judgments and the orders denying the motions for a 
new trial are reversed and the trial court is directed to grant 
the motions for change of venue. 
Gibson, O. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and 
Spence, J., concurred. 
Oarter, J., did not participate. 
